I neglected to post the most recent IAEA BoG report about Iran. Here it is.
ISPR is a good source for official Pakistani information about its missiles. For example, this February 11 press release (scroll down) describes the most recent test of Pakistan’s Hatf IX (NASR) ballistic missile.
Pakistan today conducted a successful test fire of Short Range Surface to Surface Missile Hatf IX (NASR). The test fire was conducted with successive launches of two missiles from a state of the art multi tube launcher. NASR, with a range of 60 km, and inflight maneuver capability can carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield, with high accuracy. This quick response system, which can fire a four Missile Salvo ensures deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios.
This part struck me as new:
NASR has been specially designed to defeat all known Anti Tactical Missile Defence Systems.
On the “Adventure and Sports” section of the ISPR site, one can also find an announcement for a ski course, complete with an outstanding video.
A friend pointed out this Sherman Kent piece to me recently.
The whole thing is really worth reading….this is one of my favorite parts:
How fertile the human mind in devising ways of delaying if not avoiding the moment of decision! How rich the spoken language in its vocabulary of issue-ducking! “I have a sneaker that . . . ,” “I’d drop dead of surprise if . . .”—expressions with sound but upon reflection almost without meaning. How much conviction, for example, do you have to have before you become possessed of a sneaker; how much of the unexpected does it take to cause your heart to fail?
This passage is perhaps the most relevant to proliferation:
Some years back we were obliged by force majeur to compose some tables setting forth how the Blanks might divide up an all-but-undreamed-of stockpile of fissionable material among an as-yet-unborn family of weapons. There were of course the appropriate passages of verbal warning, and then, on the chance that the numerical tables should become physically separated from the warning, the tables were overprinted in red, “This table is based on assumptions stated in . . . . Moreover, it should not be used for any purpose whatever without inclusion, in full, of the cautionary material in . . . .” More recently we have issued a document which not only began with a fulsome caveat but was set off by a format and color of paper that were new departures.
Apologies for the persistent inconsistency with this blog.
Anyway, I have an article in this month’s Arms Control Today, titled “Iraq: Disarmament Without Resolution.” It’s about the Iraq WMD thing.
While re-reading part of the 2004 ISG report, I found a discussion about the Saddam Hussein regime’s views on Iran. Some of it concerns Iran’s perceived chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities.
Saddam was very concerned about Iranian military production capabilities, particularly its nuclear weapons program, according to former Vice President Ramadan. A Ministry of Defense conference concluded in January 2003 that Iranian WMD posed a looming menace to Iraq and the region, according to a sensitive source. Attended by 200 senior officers, the conference discussed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, and possession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BW warheads over a range of 1,000 kilometers. Saddam believed that Iran had benefitted from the breakup of the former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMD as well as conventional technologies.
Iraqi military troops trained with the expectation that Iran would use CW if Iran invaded. If Iraq came under chemical or biological attack, the army would attempt to survive until the international community intervened. Tariq ‘Aziz also expressed hope that the close UN monitoring of Iraq might force international intervention in this scenario. Saddam felt that the United States would intervene to protect oilﬁelds, according to a former senior Iraqi official.
A former Corps commander stated that Saddam believed the next war would be fought in a chemical environment with heavy reliance upon missiles. Iraq assumed that Iran could manufacture CW and would use it, according to a former senior Iraqi intelligence officer. The Iraqis had identiﬁed Iranian nuclear and chemical facilities as well as 240 factories in Iran that they assessed produced missile components.
The report also contains a few enlightening paragraphs about Iraqi intelligence collection against Iran. An excerpt:
IIS conducted extensive collection operations against Iran, according to a former IIS senior officer and various captured documents. Intelligence collection as a whole targeted Iran’s weapons programs, its nuclear program, economic issues, and international relations. Human intelligence sources were the primary means of intelligence collection against Iran, supported by signals intelligence
conducted by the IIS Directorate for Signals Intelligence (M17).
Interestingly, the MEK was a source on Iran’s unconventional weapons programs:
IIS had assigned 150 officers to work the Iranian target, according to a former senior IIS officer. The IIS relied heavily on the MEK and independent assets in every province to monitor Iranian military and WMD development.
The report also discusses the regime’s use of open-source information. It didn’t always work very well, especially when it came to Iran’s nuclear program:
Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclear program in 2001, but did not contradict Iranian claims that their reactors [sic] being used for peaceful purposes, according to the former deputy director of the IIS. Regardless, Iraq assumed Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. IIS assets often passed along open source information as if it were intelligence, allowing disinformation to reach the upper levels of the former Regime.
Hopefully, you’re doing something other than reading this blog on New Year’s Day.
One last post for 2012. There will be more in 2013.
A reader wanted to know why I hadn’t thought of this. Orin S. Kerr, observing that law review editors frequently demand citations for claims that are “obvious or obscure” or “made up or false,” proposes a solution:
Legal scholars need a source they can cite when confronted with
these challenges. It should be something with an impressive but generic title. I offer this page, with the following conclusion: If you have been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is plainly true that the author’s claim is correct. For further support, consult the extensive scholarship on the point.
Quite a generous offer. I’m annoyed that I didn’t think of it, but at least another Kerr did.
In case anyone’s interested, this appears to be Canada’s policy statement regarding nuclear cooperation agreements.
Before Canada will consider nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear-weapon State, that state must make a legally binding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by becoming a party to the NPT or an equivalent international legally binding agreement and accepting the application of full-scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on all of its current and future nuclear activities.
There are lot of other similarities to U.S. 123 agreements:
any country wishing to enter into nuclear cooperation with Canada must conclude a legally-binding bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) which includes:
- assurances that Canadian nuclear exports will be used only for peaceful,non-explosive end-uses;
- Canadian control over any Canadian items subject to the NCA that are re-transferred to a third party;
- Canadian control over the reprocessing of any Canadian spent nuclear fuel;
- Canadian control over the storage and subsequent use of any separated plutonium;
- Canadian control over the high enrichment of Canadian uranium and the subsequent storage and use of the highly enriched uranium;
- implementation of bilateral safeguards in the event that IAEA safeguards are unable to be applied;
- assurances that Canadian nuclear items will be subject to adequate physical protection measures to ensure that they are not stolen or otherwise misused.
The provisions of NCAs apply to items directly or indirectly exported from Canada. They also apply to non-Canadian equipment or nuclear material used in conjunction with Canadian nuclear items and to equipment manufactured on the basis of technology provided by Canada or through “reverse engineering” of such technology.
An astute reader dug out these October 1997 responses to QFRs by then- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn.
The bulk of the information concerns North Korea’s missile programs. Here’s a statistic that I don’t remember seeing:
The DPRK has a production capacity of four to eight Scuds monthly, both for export and for its own armed forces, and has hundreds of Scuds in its current arsenal.
Also, given the recent concern about Syria’s CW and nuclear programs, I found this section interesting:
Question 7. Has there been any cooperation between North Korea and
foreign countries regarding chemical or biological weapons?
Answer. Although North Korea is an active supplier of missiles and related production technology, it has not yet become a supplier of nuclear, chemical or biological warfare- related technology.
Have a nice weekend.
I’m sure someone has noted this before, but URENCO has several games for kids designed to teach them about nuclear power.
They all feature Richie Enrichment. You can even download his theme song as a ringtone.
Here’s a trailer:
It’s a bit old, but last February, Donald Sinclair, Director General of the International Security Bureau of Canada’s Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department, commented on Iran’s nuclear program during a Parliamentary hearing.
Apparently, Ottawa thinks Iran’s trying to develop nuclear weapons – as opposed to the mere option to develop such weapons:
At the same time as we believe Iran is actively working to develop a nuclear device, they are actively improving their missile capacity. You put these two together, and it more than doubles your worry; it is exponential. They have demonstrated that they can develop missile technology with a range that could cover Israel, for example, and most of Europe. It is no accident that NATO, in its response to the Iranian missile threat, is constructing a very expensive missile defence system to protect European territory from the horrific possibility of an Iranian missile attack. You take your defensive measures far in advance of the anticipated offensive capacity of a potential adversary. NATO is determined to build this missile defence system, which is directed at Iran’s activities.
Will they have the capacity to use a nuclear device? There are a number of variables, of course. They actually have to produce a nuclear weapon, miniaturize it, fit it onto a missile and develop their missile technology. Since they are beavering away on those particular problems and issues, one has to take into account the horrific potential that the answer to your question could be yes, they could develop the capacity. They do not have it yet, fortunately, but they have shown no indication of reversing their behaviour. That is where we are today.